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I.

ORVIS IS ENTITLED TO RENEWAL OF THE BELDING JUDGMENT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, AND JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS FLOWING FROM
AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP WITH ORVIS ARE IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL.
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INTEREST WITH ORVIS ARE MATERIAL, THESE ALLEGATIONS ARE
NONETHELESS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA UNDER JUDGE HANSON'S
RULING OF NO PARTNERSHIP
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PROTECTIVE ORDER AND AWARDING ORVIS HIS ATTORNEYS'
FEES
10

JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2-2(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue Number 1: Was Judge Medley correct in renewing a judgment validly
assigned to plaintiff/appellee Orvis when Orvis brought an action to renew the judgment
within the eight years provided by Utah statute?
This issue was preserved. [R. at 32-36]l
This Court reviews Judge Medley's grant of summary judgment for correctness.
Young v. Salt Lake Citv Sch. Dist.. 2002 UT 64. If 10. 52 P.3d 1230.
Issue Number 2: Was Judge Medley correct in rejecting defendant/appellant
Johnson's attack on the assignment of a judgment to Orvis because the purchaser and
assigner of the judgment was an administratively dissolved corporation when Utah law
holds that the acts of an administratively dissolved corporation are merely voidable and
not void and are only voidable by the parties to those acts, and that Johnson, not a party
to the assignment, therefore had no standing to attack the assignment?
This issue was preserved. [R. at 459-65]
This Court reviews Judge Medley's legal conclusions for correctness. Id.
Issue Number 3: Did Judge Medley abuse his discretion in declining to strike a
reply and affidavit submitted by Orvis when the reply and affidavit were filed to counter

]

The reference to "R." in the citation is to the record in the district court as
paginated by the district court clerk.
in

an equitable case Johnson was attempting to make on Johnson's behalf, were not
submitted for any improper purpose, and were not relied upon by Judge Medley in
rendering his decision on summary judgment?
This issue was preserved. [R. at 590-602]
This Court reviews Judge Medley's decision to deny Johnson's motion to strike
for abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59. % 16. 6 P.3d 1120.
Issue Number 4: Did Judge Medley abuse his discretion in granting a protective
order and awarding attorneys' fees to Orvis when Johnson served a notice of depositions
on counsel for Orvis at 6:00 p.m. on the night before the first scheduled deposition?
This issue was preserved. [R. at 756-59]
This Court reviews Judge Medley's decision to grant a protective order and award
attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek,
684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2001, Orvis purchased a judgment owned by a plaintiff, Pamela Belding,
against Johnson. [R. 46-50] This judgment was set to expire under Utah law, and,
accordingly, Orvis filed a complaint to renew it. The case was assigned to the Honorable
Tyrone Medley. [R. 1-3]

2

Johnson did not appeal Judge Medley's order denying Johnson's motion for Rule
11 sanctions. Even so, Johnson briefed that issue in his opening brief. While that issue is
not properly before the Court, Orvis has briefed the issue in the event the Court considers
that issue on appeal.
iv

In March of 2004, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to renew
the judgment. [R. 29-75] The supporting memorandum was four pages long and simply
cited to the law regarding renewal of judgment. [R. 32-36] In response, Johnson filed a
13 page opposition and affidavit with voluminous exhibits alleging all manner of facts
against Orvis that were entirely irrelevant to the legal question of whether the judgment
should be renewed. [R. 97-452] These facts included all of those Johnson alleges here
on appeal regarding an alleged partnership between Johnson and Orvis. [Id.] At the
time, the question of whether there existed such a partnership was pending in a
declaratory action before Judge Timothy Hanson.3 [R.460]
In response to Johnson's opposition, Orvis filed a reply and an affidavit of a
private investigator hired by Orvis' counsel to investigate the financial affairs of
Johnson. [459-579] The substance of the affidavit was that Johnson had intentionally
structured his financial life so as to be completely immune from his many creditors,
including the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. [Id.]
Johnson filed a motion to strike Orvis's reply and the affidavit. [580-589] On
October 26, 2004, Judge Medley granted Orvis's motion for summary judgment and

Subsequent to the resolution of the instant case, Judge Hanson ruled on summary
judgment that no such partnership exists. [R. at 1055-1060] Orvis maintains that none of
Johnson's allegations regarding an alleged partnership with Orvis are material to the legal
question of whether the Belding judgment should be renewed; however, should the Court
deem otherwise, all of these allegations are nonetheless barred under the doctrine of res
judicata by Judge Hanson's determination that there was no partnership. See infra at pp.
4-6. Judge Hanson's decision is currently on appeal by Johnson before this Court.
Johnson v. Orvis, Appeal No. 2004112-CA.
v

denied Johnson's motion to strike, holding that the question of whether the Belding
judgment should be renewed was a simple question of law and that Orvis had replied and
submitted the affidavit to counter an equitable case that Johnson appeared to be
attempting to make in his favor. [R. at 807-808, 1175-77]
Despite the fact that a motion for summary judgment was pending, Johnson
sought discovery from Orvis, and, in one instance, filed a notice of deposition on Orvis'
counsel at 6:00 p.m. for a deposition scheduled for the following morning. [777-779]
Orvis moved for a protective order and attorneys' fees and was granted both by Judge
Medley. [756-759,766-768,773-787,816-818]
Finally, Johnson filed a Rule 11 motion against counsel for Orvis based on the
fact the private investigator hired by counsel to investigate Johnson's financial affairs
was not licensed by the State of Utah. [862-1045] On March 14, 2005, Judge Medley
denied Johnson's Rule 11 motion holding that Orvis' counsel was not aware that the

vi

investigator was not licensed and did not submit the affidavit for any improper purpose.
[R. at 1172-78]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Assignment of Belding Judgment to Plaintiff Orvis, Orvis's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Johnson's Motion to Strike

On April 5, 1995, a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Pamela Belding
against Johnson by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Provo Department, Utah County,
State of Utah in the amount of $192,289.01 plus accrued interest. [R. at 42-44] On
August 23, 2001, Ms. Belding assigned her interest in the judgment to All Star Financial,
L.L.C. ("All Star Financial") without reservation (the "Belding judgment"). [R. at 46]
On August 24, 2001, All Star Financial assigned the Belding judgment to Orvis. [R. at
50]4
Orvis, on June 7, 2002, filed a complaint to renew the Belding judgment to
prevent it from expiring under the eight year statutory limit set forth under Utah law. [R.
at 1-3]
Johnson answered the complaint on July 16, 2002, and also filed a counterclaim
making numerous allegations against Orvis all based on an alleged partnership between
Johnson or Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson and Orvis with respect to certain credit
repair entities owned by Orvis; Johnson alleged, for example, that the Belding judgment

4

In July of 2001, All Star Financial was administratively dissolved by the State of
Utah. [R. at 102] Orvis had no ownership interest in and was not aware of the
administrative status of All Star Financial. [R. at 461]
vii

was purchased with embezzled partnership assets and that Orvis breached his fiduciary
duty as partner to Johnson in purchasing the Belding judgment. [R. at 9-18]
More than a year and a half after Johnson filed his answer and counterclaim,
Orvis, on March 26, 2004, moved for summary judgment, requesting that the Belding
Judgment be renewed. [R. at 29-35] In Orvis' supporting memorandum, Orvis argued
that Johnson's allegations in his answer and counterclaim regarding a partnership with
Orvis were entirely irrelevant to the case's resolution, and that the only relevant
questions were (1) was the judgment entered, (2) was the judgment assigned, and (3) did
Orvis bring the action within eight years after entry of judgment. [R. at 34]
Johnson, 2 1/2 months after Orvis filed the motion for summary judgment, filed a
13 page opposition and affidavit with voluminous exhibits making the same allegations
against Orvis that he made in his answer and counterclaim about an alleged partnership
with Orvis and argued that Judge Medley should not renew the Belding judgment based
on those allegations. [R. at 97-452] As a legal matter, Johnson argued that Judge
Medley should not renew the Belding judgment because All Star Financial had been
administratively dissolved by the State of Utah shortly before it purchased and then
assigned the Belding judgment to Orvis. [R. at 104-06]
Orvis timely filed a reply to Johnson's opposition. [R. at 459-65] In this reply,
Orvis argued that the fact All Star Financial was administratively dissolved when it
purchased and assigned the Belding judgment was no bar to its renewal, relying on
Miller v. Celebration Mining Co.. 2001 UT 64. ^f 6. 29 P.3d 123 L where the Supreme
viii

Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved
corporation is not void, but voidable, by the other party(ies) to that contract, and Paradise
Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales. Inc. 315 F.3d 1293, 1310 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which cited
to Miller as "holding that under Utah law, a contract entered into by an administratively
dissolved corporation may be voided by the other party to the contract, but is not
automatically void." [R. at 461-62] Also as part of his reply, Orvis attached the affidavit
of William F. Crawley, who had been hired by Orvis' counsel to investigate Johnson's
financial affairs ("Crawley affidavit"). The Crawley affidavit listed such facts as that
Johnson resided in a house the current tax value of which exceeded $850,000 and that
Johnson had federal and state tax liens filed against him totaling over $1.9 million. [R. at
467]
On June 22, 2004, Johnson filed a motion to strike Orvis's reply and the Crawley
affidavit [R. at 580-81]
Judge Medley held a hearing on Orvis' motion for summary judgment and
Johnson's motion to strike on October 15, 2004. [R. at 1114] At this hearing, Judge
Medley granted Orvis' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Judge Medley held:
I'm satisfied that the motion for summary judgement is in fact, very well taken
and quite frankly narrow. I mean it seeks renewal of the judgment because of its
narrow scope and in this court's view the criteria to be considered is reasonably
narrow and in this court's view it is, in fact, undisputed again from my vantage
point that the complaint to renew the judgement was timely filed.
[R. 1114 at 32-33]

ix

With respect to Johnson's allegations against Orvis related to the alleged
partnership in Orvis' credit repair entities, Judge Medley found:
These issues raised by Mr. Johnson and all of the issues raised by Mr. Johnson as
they relate to the partnership I'm finding to be immaterial to the actual renewal of
the judgement itself.. ..
[R. 1114 at 33]
With respect to Johnson's attacks on the Belding judgment because of the
administrative status of All Star Financial, Judge Medley held that the issue was
governed by Miller v. Celebration Mining Co.. 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001). where the
Supreme Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved
corporation is not void, but merely voidable by the parties to the contract; as Johnson was
not a party to the contract, Judge Medley held that he had no standing to challenge it:
That the assignments for a certain purpose of judgement renewal were in fact and
are in fact valid and consistent with the Miller case and Mr. Johnson has no
standing to challenge the Miller case which I'm finding to be controlling clearly
speaks in terms of assignments being voidable as opposed to being void and
voidable by the parties to the agreement itself.
[R. 1114 at 33]
With regard to Johnson's motion to strike, Judge Medley stated that he "surmised"
that the reason Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit was in "case this court had some
concerns about equitable considerations." [Id.] Judge Medley stated he "ha[d] not
factored in any equitable considerations into this particular decision" and that the matter
Johnson was attempting to have stricken "was not relied upon by the [c]ourt in rendering
this decision." [Id.]
x

Judge Medley, on October 26, 2004, signed an order granting Orvis's motion for
summary judgment and holding that the assignments of the Belding judgment were valid
and denying Johnson's motion to strike. [R. at 807-808]
B.

Orvis' Motion for Protective Order and Attorneys' Fees

Johnson had more than 1 1/2 years to conduct any fact discovery he deemed
necessary before Orvis filed his motion for summary judgment. Johnson did not conduct
fact discovery during that time, and did not file a Rule 56(f) motion requesting discovery
before the court ruled on Orvis' motion for summary judgment. Instead, eleven days
before the hearing on the summary judgment motion, Johnson, on October 4, 2004 at
6:00 p.m., served Orvis' counsel with a notice of depositions for three depositions, the
first one to begin the following morning at 9:00 a.m. [R. at 747-48]
Orvis promptly the next day, on October 5, 2004, moved for a protective order
and sanctions, arguing that the notice of the depositions was entirely unreasonable and
that discoveiy was in any event improper given the pending motion for summary
judgment. [R. at 766-68]
Judge Medley held a hearing on Orvis' motions at which he granted Orvis' motion
for a protective order, ordered that no depositions take place during the pendency of
Orvis' motion for summary judgment, and awarded Orvis his "reasonable attorney's fees
for seeking the protective order." [R. 1113 at 24-26] At the hearing, Judge Medley
noted that discovery during the pendency of a motion for summary judgment is generally

xi

inappropriate, unless a party files a Rule 56(f) motion, which Johnson did not do. [R.
1113 at 17]
Judge Medley went on to hold that, in any event, the notice was unreasonable:
"It's not often, because of the way Rule 26 and 30 are structured .. . that I get called in to
deal with scheduling of depositions. When I am called in on these kinds of issues - Fm
not sure I've ever been called in in a situation where opposing Counsel is served what I
would consider later in the business day or the evening before the deposition was to take
place. That seems to me, clearly on its face, does not appear to be reasonable notice."
[Record 1113 at 10] Judge Medley further held that he had not "heard anything
compelling that would - that persuades me that the short notice is, under the
circumstances, reasonable notice, which of course is what the rule requires." [R. 1113 at
16]
C.

Johnson's Rule 11 Motion

On November 24, 2004, Johnson filed a Rule 11 motion against Orvis and his
counsel, Peggy A. Tomsic. [R. at 862-63] The basis for Johnson's motion was that he
had discovered the investigator, William Crawley, that Ms. Tomsic hired to investigate
Johnson's finances for purposes of collecting upon a judgment did not possess a private
investigator's license, and that the Crawley affidavit was improperly submitted. [R. at
897-907]
On December 7, 2004, Ms. Tomsic filed an affidavit in which she testified that
she was not aware when she hired Mr. Crawley that he did not possess a private
xii

investigator's license, that she knew that he had done like investigations many times over
the y ears, and that once she 1 • as infoi med of the situation , she gave Is ii Craw le> no
further investigative work. [R. at 1052-53]
Also on December 7, 2004, Orvis filed an opposition to Johnson's Rule 11 motion
in which he argued that the ,a., . .

..rav\ ic\ am .,ot possess a private investigator's

license did not Impact the\ eracit} of the information i incovered b> } ii Crawley and
that, outside of the precise number of times Johnson had appeared as a defendant in the
State of Utah, Johnson did not dispute the accuracy of anything reported by Mr. Crawley.

i

i
On February 23, 2005, Mr. Crawley filed an affidavit in which he testified:
(1)

He had been an investigative paralegal for over 18 years, and had

performed investigate e services for < ' ai ioi is la • >firmsthi oi lghoi it Salt I ake City
as both an employee and independent contract and had been appointed at various
times by both state and federal courts to provide such investigative paralegal
services. [R at 1122-23]
(2)

Both he and Ms. Tomsic believed that he was authorized to conduct

the investigation he conducted of Johnson's financial affairs. [R. at 1122]
(3)

I le I lad ";il 'absolutely no intention of \ iolating the law. It was my

understanding that if I was working on behalf of an attorney, I was authorized to
conduct such investigative services." [Id.]

xni

(4)

He was contacted by the Department of Public Safety concerning

the issue, cooperated fully with them, and was in the process of obtaining the
required license.5 [R. 1123-24]
(5)

Outside of one phone call with Johnson's son in which he verified

the business address of Johnson, his contact with Johnson's children was limited
solely to his attempts to serve Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson with
subpoenas issued by federal court. Once service was effected, he had no further
contact with Johnson's children. [R. at 1124-25]
Judge Medley, on March 14, 2005, held a hearing on Johnson's Rule 11 motion,
at the conclusion of which he denied Johnson's motion. [R. at 1165] On April 29, 2005,
Judge Medley entered detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting his
ruling denying Rule 11 sanctions, including as follows:
(1)

Orvis moved for summary judgment "on the narrow legal issue of

whether a judgment owned by plaintiff against defendant should be renewed." [R.
at 1176]
(2)

Johnson replied making "numerous factual allegations that were

equitable in nature, and that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons
why defendant should not be held to the judgment owed by him." [Id.]

5

Counsel notes for the record that William Crawley has since obtained a private
investigator's license.
xiv

(3)

"In reply, plaintiff submitted an affidavit of William Crawley, an

investigate e paralegal "\ v I: 1011 11" Is I 'omsic 1 lad I: til e d t 3 look into the finai icial
affairs of Johnson. Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit to counter the equitable
case Johnson had attempted to make in his opposition." [Id.]
(4)

.

•

:av..c -*\as required to

and did not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not intend
in any way to operate outside the law." [R. at 1177]
(5)

'IVi

1 omsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr.

(6)

"Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the information

contained in the affidavit of Mr. Crawley, except that he contests the number of
1 *

; ;,eai

* <l^>-:

^'»i,

' '

.1

counter-number or any record support for his contestation." [Id.]
(7)

"Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not cover this

sili mtic ii 01 the actic ns complained aboi it li; ' defendai it "" " |[ I :i ]
(8)

"As noted, Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the

affidavit of Mr. Crawley." "Even, however, were the affidavit deemed irrelevant,
R 1 ill, ;: 11 does iiot pi c • ' ide sanctions foi submittii ig ii i ele\ ant material " | I :!! ]
(9)

"The fact that Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's

license is of no legal moment in this proceeding." [Id ]

xv

D.

Proceedings Before Judge Hanson

On December 7, 2004, Orvis submitted to Judge Medley the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law signed by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on November 23, 2004 in Orvis
v. Johnson, Case No. 010907449, in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah ("Hanson action") relative to Orvis' motion for summary judgment against
Johnson. The Hanson action involved the same allegations Johnson made before Judge
Medley that there was a partnership between Orvis and Johnson relative to the credit
repair businesses of Orvis. [R. at 1053-60] Judge Hanson made the following factual
findings, based on the undisputed record, and legal conclusions in holding that Johnson
did not have a partnership with Orvis, and Orvis was, therefore, entitled to a declaratory
judgment to that effect.
(1)
that Johnson

Orvis sought in that action [Hanson Action] a declaratory judgment
"has no right, claim or interest relative to any business or venture
relating to the credit repair business in which plaintiff has any
ownership." [R. at 1056]

(2)

Johnson "asserts that a partnership exists between him and Orvis

and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds from intellectual property
lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various credit repair entities."
[14]
(3)

On September 14, 1995, the Small Business Administration

("SBA") filed a complaint against Jamis Johnson in federal court, United States of
xvi

America v. Jamis Johnson, 2:95-CV-838J, in the United States District Court for
the Cei itral District : f I Jtah: ji ldgi nent s\ as entered against defei idant in that case
on September 29, 1997. [R. at 1059]
(4)

On November 17, 1999, the SB A deposed Johnson in

supplementary proceedings in an attempt to identify income or assets of Mr.
Johnson that the SB \ ecu Ud execi ite I lpon to settle its jri ldgment against J oh nsoi I.
[R. at 1059] At this November 17, 1999, deposition, Johnson explicitly denied
having any interest in any partnership or limited liability company:

"jonnson, under oatn, disavowed any interest, partnersnip or otnerwise, in me
credit repair business of Orvis. There was no question of mistake. Johnson
testified us In did s< .i, In ,n TI) ; n | | 4 j

(6)

m n

cITorls h\ Ihr SB \

\H .i! I1'!'"

u

|

On March 29, 2004, Orvis moved for summary judgment on the

ground of judicial estoppel, arguing that because Johnson had denied owning any
partnership interests in his testimony before the SB..A he w as ji idicially e stoppel
from contradicting that sworn statement and later claiming a partnership interest
in the credit repair entities of Orvis. [R. at 1057]

xvii

(7)

On August 9, 2004, Judge Hanson held a hearing on Orvis's motion

for summary judgment. [R. at 1057]
(8).

"The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting

a different position in this later action from the position to which he testified
under oath in the SBA case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to
contradict his testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here."
[R. at 1058]
(9)

"Johnson has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise

or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any ownership interest." [R.
at 1060]

xvin

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

motion for summary judgment to renew the Belnap judgment. The undisputed facts were
that the Belnap judgment had been entered, and Orvis had filed the renewal action within
8 years o: •:,-

.

,uugi:ieiL

^-i L utw ,

^ .vmler case, the a^iLaunL'i:

,

r

Belnap judgment to Orvis, as a matter of law, was valid, entitling Orvis to summary
judgment renewing the Belnap judgment.
Separately and independently, Orvis was entitled to summary judgment renewing

with Orvis are barred by the rule of res judicata under Judge Hanson's ruling that there
was no such partnership, j k. 1055-6* * |
Judge Medley i •

:•.

disci : tloii in ck c In ling to grant Johnson' s i notion

to strike the Crawley affidavit. The affidavit was filed by Orvis to counter Johnson's
"equitable considerations" raised to try to avoid summary judgment, Johnson does not

on the Crawley affidavit in rendering his decision on summary judgment.
Finally, Judge Medley did not abuse his discretion in issuing a protective order
and a \ v ar ding Or v is his attoi ney's fees based oi i Johnson sei * iiig a notice of deposition
during the pendency of the motion for summary judgment and at 6:00 o'clock p.m. the
evening before the first deposition was scheduled to begin.
ARGUMENT
1

L

ORVIS IS ENTITLED TO RENEWAL OF THE BELDING JUDGMENT,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS FLOWING
FROM AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP WITH ORVIS ARE
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL.
Utah law holds that an owner of a judgment may file an action to renew that

judgment if that action is brought within the eight-year time limit set forth in the Utah
Code.6 See, e.g.. Mason v. Mason. 579 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979): Von Hake v. Thomas.
858 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is a sound basis for that rule, as the Utah
Supreme Court has stated: If a creditor is not able to renew a judgment, "he has no way
of preventing the loss of his justly adjudicated claim." Mason. 579 P.2d at 1324 (noting
difference in this respect between causes of actions and judgments; in the latter case,
"[t]he owner of the cause of action has already resorted to the court to preserve it and
unless he can bring another action on the judgment within the eight-year period, he has
no way of preventing the loss of his justly adjudicated claim.") (emphasis added).
There are only three essential elements, under Utah law, that Orvis was required
to establish to obtain a judgment renewing the Belding judgment. Those three elements
are: (1) the Belnap judgment was entered, (2) the judgment was validly assigned to
Orvis, and (3) Orvis brought the Medley action within eight years after entry of the
Belnap judgment. Based on the undisputed record and applicable law, Orvis established
each of these three elements, and Judge Medley was correct in finding Johnson's

6

Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code provides that "[a]n action may be brought
within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any
territory within the United States."
2

allegations relating to an alleged partnership with Orvis immaterial and in renewing the
Beldii lg judgment as a mat I: =
:; i of la;1 * <

7

The only law on which Johnson relies against the renewal of the Belding
judgment conflicts with an explicit ruling by the Supreme Court of Utah. Johnson
alleged belo \ v , and coi i ectb - as it turns out, that t \ II Stai I 'inancial had been
administratively dissolved when it purchased the judgment from Ms. Belding and when it

Johnson's allegations against Victor Lawrence and Aii Star Financial must of
course be disregarded because neither is a party to this case. For example, Johnson has an
entire section of his brief entitled "Attorney Victor Lawrence" when Mr. Lawrence is not
even a party. Clearly this Court may not make findings with regard, for example, to civil
conspiracy against a party not named and who therefore has no dog in this fight. Indeed,
such a finding would undermine the purpose of requiring joinder under Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to protect the interests of absent persons. Smith
v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361. ^T 47, 58 P.3d 854. Similarly, Johnson has a section on
All Star Financial and his allegations regarding All Star Financial are really quite
astounding given that he has not named All Star Financial and that he has not
demonstrated any connection whatsoever between Orvis and All Star Financial so that
what All Star Financial is currently "up to"could even conceivably be relevant to this case
or to Orvis.
It should be noted as well that Johnson makes numerous misrepresentations to tllis
Court. On page 27, for example, Johnson states that Orvis "actually stated that the
offending affidavit and reply were submitted for an irrelevant and a malicious purpose."
This is of course also untrue. [R. at 1176] On page 28, Johnson states that Judge Medley
ordered attorneys' fees with no oral argument. This too is untrue. [R. at 1113]
One last point - Johnson constantly refers to All Star Financial as a "sham" LLC
with absolutely no evidence therefor. The fact that All Star Financial is still, according to
Johnson, conducting business - authorized or no - argues against a conclusion that All
Star Financial was a "sham" LLC set up by Orvis.
In sum, while Orvis vigorously disputes all of Johnson's allegations, the foregoing
are but an example of Johnson's willingness to misdirect this Court by asserting wholly
irrelevant arguments and making untrue statements with no record support.
3

assigned the judgment to Orvis. Johnson, relying on the Utah Code with respect to
administrative dissolution, unequivocally concludes that the assignments to All Star
Financial and from All Star Financial are therefore void. But the provisions of the Utah
Code cited to by Johnson say no such thing, and the Supreme Court of Utah has held the
precise opposite.
In Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 2001 UT 64. ^ 6. 29 P.3d 123 L the Supreme
Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved
corporation is not void, but voidable, by the other party(ies) to that contract. See also
Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales. Inc. 315 F.3d 1293, 1310 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing to Miller as "holding that under Utah law, a contract entered into by an
administratively dissolved corporation may be voided by the other party to the contract,
but is not automatically void") (emphasis in original).
Johnson attempts unsuccessfully (and, frankly, confusingly) to read Miller as
holding other than what it quite clearly does and then cites to two non-Utah cases and an
entirely irrelevant Utah Court of Appeals case.
First, Johnson cites to White v. Dvorak, 896 P.2d 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). a
curious choice because the case comes out entirely the wrong way for Johnson, holding
as it does, that "[w]hile [a] corporation's lack of capacity affects its ability to enforce a
contract, the absence of capacity does not invalidate the contract." Id. at 88. Brend v.
Dome Development Ltd.. 418 N.W.2d 610 fN.D. 1988). does appear to support
Johnson's position, but it is of course non-binding particularly in light of explicit Utah
4

law to the contrary. Murphv v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994), does not

corporation without authority to do so may be held jointly and severally liable for any
debts and liabilities incurred as a result of their unauthorized actions.
Judge I\ f exile: > vv as c :« i e ct in holding that Miller conti ols this case, tl lat the
assignments to and from All Star Financial are not void, no party to the contracts has
sought to void them, and that Johnson, not being a party to those contracts, has no
standing to challenge the validity of them, juage ivieuic) 's grant of summary judgment
to Orvis, therefore, must be I lpheld by this Coi irt.

II.

SHOULD THE COURT, CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, FIND THAT
JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO A PARTNERSHIP
INTEREST WITH ORVIS ARE MATERIAL, THESE ALLEGATIONS
ARE NONETHELESS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA IJNDER JlIDGE
HANSON'S RULING OF NO PARTNERSHIP,
"The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously

litigated issues from being relitigated." Youren v. Tintic School District 86 P.3d 771.
77? (I'lnh "!' I ,p|i "004 I I |ii. »tmg Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 6 6 J , ,Adl\
2002)). 8 Because Judge Hanson has ruled that there was and is no partnership between

8

Moreover, res judicata applies notwithstanding the fact that Judge Hanson's
decision is currently on appeal before this Court. See Youren, 86 P.3d at 773 ("A
judgment or order, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on
appeal or modified or set aside in the court of rendition.") (quoting Copper State Thrift &
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
5

Johnson and Orvis, Johnson may not attempt to relitigate that issue in the Medley action
which is the subject of this appeal. [R. 1175-79].
Under Utah law, "[r]es judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion." Id. Johnson's allegation of a partnership (and all
allegations flowing therefrom) is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. Outside of
Johnson's allegation with respect to the invalidity of the judgment because of the
administrative dissolution of All Star Financial, all of the allegations Johnson made
below and on appeal here against the renewal of the Belding judgment are based upon
Johnson's fundamental allegation of Johnson's partnership with Orvis in Orvis's credit
repair business. But Judge Hanson has entered a final judgment that no such partnership
exists. Accordingly, every allegation of Johnson flowing from the supposition of its
existence is barred by res judicata, issue preclusion, including Johnson's allegation that
the judgment was purchased with embezzled partnership funds, that the judgment is
partnership property, and that Orvis owes any sort of fiduciary duty towards Johnson, or
that he breached any such duty in purchasing the Belding judgment.9
9

Orvis suspects that Johnson may try to cloud this very straightforward issue by
claiming that DaNell Johnson and not he actually owns the partnership interest. This is
an argument, however, that must be rejected. To begin with, and as a very elementary
matter, Johnson cannot give what he does not own. Johnson claims that his wife DaNell
holds the "beneficial interest" of his partnership in Orvis's credit repair business. But a
person may not hold a beneficial interest in something that does not exist. Judge Hanson
ruled that Johnson has no partnership interest in Mr. Orvis's credit repair business;
DaNell Johnson owns therefore a beneficial interest in nothing. Second, Johnson never
once limits the ownership of the partnership interest solely to DaNell; while he does
allege that DaNell holds a beneficial interest, in every one of his pleadings, Johnson refers
as well to the "Johnsons'" partnership interest. And the "Johnsons" are judicially
6

Issue preclusion applies where "(I) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is
identical to the one presente d in the instant actr : i 1; (2) the pai t> against \ hoi n issi le
preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; and
(3) the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first
MMI M'sutiecJ in n liiml iiidgniuil mi lln; imnils,

Buckner v. Kennard, 99 p.3d 842. 847

(Utah 2004). Each of the required elements is easily met here.
First, the issue before Judge Hanson is identical to the issue Johnson has raised
here - name)), did a partnership exist between Johnson and Orvis.
Second, Johnson, against whom issue preclusion is asserted, w as a part> to the
prior adjudication.
Third, the issue of whether there existed a partnership was completely, fully, and
!:sirh !itip;itni

»*»{? -.on made his argument that a partnership existed 11 11 111 lltiple

pleadings and oral argument before Judge Hanson. [Record at 1057]
Finally, the suit before Judge Hanson resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
R es ji idicata , therefoi e. bars all of Johnsoi 1" s clain is aga.Ii 1st renew al hei e, as tl lej J
all flow from a partnership that Judge Hanson has ruled does not exist. Res judicata

estopped from claiming a partnership interest because Jamis Johnson is judicially
estopped from claiming a partnership interest. Third, DaNell Johnson is not a party to
this action, and Johnson cannot assert and ask this Court to adjudicate a right of a
nonparty.

7

requires that this Court disregard all of Johnson's allegations based on and flowing from
his allegation of a partnership with Orvis.10
III.

JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DECLINING
TO GRANT JOHNSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE.
Judge Medley had considerable discretion in determining whether to strike the

Crawley affidavit, Nelson-Waggoner. 2000 UT at ^ 16, and Johnson has given this Court
no reason to find that Judge Medley abused that discretion. Judge Medley found that
Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit to counter the equitable case Johnson was
attempting to make against renewal of the Belding judgment. It is ironic indeed then that
Johnson disputes that he was attempting to make an equitable case below, and therefore
that the submission of the Crawley affidavit was unjustified, given that Johnson
continues on appeal to attempt to avoid clear law for what he claims are equitable
considerations in his favor. For example, on page 42 of the Brief of Appellant, Johnson
argues:
There are further considerations here which are equitable defenses that would
have prevented summary judgment. Reviving a void assignment from the corpse
of a dissolved LLC is an equitable remedy, not one sounding in law. The law,
10

One of the stated purposes for res judicata is to prevent a litigant from subjecting
an opponent to, and forcing the opponent to defend himself against, the same allegations
over and over. As the Supreme Court of Utah has termed it, res judicata exists "[to]
protect[ ] litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation." Buckner. 99 P.3d at 847.
Other purposes - "(1) preserving the integrity of the judicial system by preventing
inconsistent judicial outcomes; [and] (2) promoting judicial economy by preventing
previously litigated issue from being relitigated," id., - are also served by application here
of res judicata. At base, Johnson has had his day in court with respect to his allegations
of a partnership. He lost, and he "does not get a second chance to prevail. . . ." IdL
8

UCA48-2C-1203 and 1208 clearly states that All Star, LLC hasn't the capacity to
deal in these assignments. Equity, however, allows the assignments to escape the
harsh thrust of the law voiding them, if the parties thereto agree that the
assignments be kept in force. To keep the assignments alive, equity must step in.
Johnson then proceeds to discourse on the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and
laches and to argue based thereon that the Belding judgment should not be renewed.
Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit in order to demonstrate that, should Judge
Medley take equity into consideration, equity did not run in favor of Johnson.
Moreover, while Johnson is clearly outraged about the Crawley affidavit, he does
not contest any of the facts discovered by Mr. Crawley. Outside of the precise number of
times he has appeared as a defendant in the State of Utah (and Johnson does not provide
a counter-number or any documentation therefor), Johnson does not dispute a single fact
contained in the Crawley affidavit, such as the worth of his home or the amount that he
owes to creditors generally and to the Internal Revenue Service and Utah State Tax
Commission in particular.
Finally, Judge Medley held that he did not rely on the Crawley affidavit in
rendering his decision on summary judgment.
This Court should affirm Judge Medley's Order refusing to strike the Crawley
affidavit.

9

IV.

JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN ISSUING A
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND AWARDING ORVIS HIS ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Normally, as

Judge Medley found, discovery during the pendency of a motion for summary judgment
is inappropriate. Where this is not so, a party may file a Rule 56(f) motion requesting
discovery in the face of a motion for summary judgment. Johnson failed to do so. Judge
Medley therefore found that any discovery was unwarranted.
In this context, it is particularly hollow for Johnson to argue there were
"compelling circumstances" justifying such unreasonable notice. Johnson's argument
that he needed to depose Paul Schwenke and Victor Lawrence as an emergency matter
because allegedly Schwenke was going to jail and Lawrence to Greece is nonsense.
Neither Schwenke nor Lawrence is a party to this matter, counsel for Orvis had never
sought to depose them, and had no information or interest in their whereabouts or doings.
Given the foregoing, it would have been an abuse of discretion for Judge Medley
not to issue a protective order or to award reasonable attorneys' fees. Whatever
reasonable notice means, it certainly does not mean 6:00 p.m. on the eve before a
deposition is scheduled to take place. As Judge Medley noted:
I should not, and it's not my intention to make a personal criticism, but this
is the first time that I've dealt with a noticed deposition that was noticed or
served the evening before the day that the deposition was to take place. I
think that's a highly, highly unusual set of circumstances.
[Record 1113, at p. 25]

10

Judge Medley had considerable discretion in deciding to grant a protective order
and award Orvis his reasonable attorneys' fees, Schamanek, 684 P.2d at 1266. and he
clearly did not abuse that discretion.
V.

JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING
JOHNSON'S RULE 11 MOTION11
Trial judges have considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant Rule 11

sanctions. K.F.W. v. T.W. and B.L.W.. 2005 UT App. 85, 110 P.3d 162. In this case,
Judge Medley considered Johnson's arguments both in pleadings and in oral argument
and specifically found that Orvis had moved for summary judgment "on the narrow legal
issue of whether a judgment owned by [Orvis] against [Johnson] should be renewed," [R.
at 1176]; that, in response, Johnson made "numerous factual allegations that were
equitable in nature, and that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons why
[Johnson] should not be held to the judgment owed by him," [Id.]; that Orvis submitted
the Crawley affidavit "to counter the equitable case [Johnson] had attempted to make in
his opposition," [Id.]; that "Ms. Tomsic had no knowledge that Mr. Crawley was
required to and did not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not
intend in any way to operate outside the law," [R. at 1177]; that "Ms. Tomsic had a good
faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. Crawley," [Id.]; and that "[Johnson] does not
contest the accuracy of the information contained in the affidavit of Mr. Crawley." [Id.]
11

Johnson did not appeal Judge Medley's Order denying Rule 11 sanctions, and
this issue is not properly before the Court. Johnson, however, briefed this issue in his
opening brief, and Orvis has responded in the event the Court addresses and renders a
decision on this Order.
11

These findings are entitled to great deference by this Court. At base, Johnson has
failed to demonstrate that Rule 11 applies here or, even if it did, that anyone acted
improperly or in bad faith or that Johnson was harmed in any way. This Court must
affirm the denial of Johnson's Rule 11 motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Judge Medley's grant of
summary judgment to Orvis, his grant of a protective order and attorneys' fees to Orvis,
his denial of Johnson's motion to strike, and his denial of Johnson's Rule 11 motion.
DATED this otfcttay of September, 2005.
fOMSk: & PECK LLC

PeggjML Tomsic
136EastSouthTemple, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
Jayson Orvis
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 26, 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street
#304
Salt Lake City, UT
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here —

2

MR. JOHNSON: I understand.

The —

her —

3

THE COURT: You still want to make the argument though?

4

MR. JOHNSON: Well, her mention of the Lawrence matter

5

was not in her argument, I didn't have a chance to address that

6

and I just want to give one thought and I'll leave.

7

The Hansen motion for summary judgement has been

8

disregarded by Judge Hansen himself.

9

case and it didn't resolve anything and I argue thaj: it's

10

different parties and it's irrelevant.

11

It is not what she said it was.

Orvis is still in the

That's all, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you for your time, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Listen, before

15

taking the bench I reviewed the written materials that were the

16

subject of the motion for summary judgement.

17

as well that I've been apprized as it relates to this motion to

18

strike.

19

of my limited law clerk resources on this particular case so I

20

had the benefit of some independent research as to the related

21

issues

22

I'm going to rule as follows.

23

I'm now satisfied

Not that this is significant at all, I did spend some

and from everything

that

I've reviewed and

considered,

I'm satisfied that the motion for summary judgement is

24

m

fact, very well taken and quite frankly narrow.

I mean it

25

seeks renewal of the judgement because of its narrow scope and
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in this court's view the criteria to be considered is

2

reasonably narrow and in this court's view it is, in fact,

3

undisputed again from my vantage point that the complaint to

4

renew the judgement was timely filed.

5

That the assignments for a certain purpose of

6

judgement renewal were in fact and are. in fact valid and

7

consistent with the Miller case and Mr. Johnson has no standing

8

to challenge those assignments and from my review of the Miller

9

case which I'm finding to be controlling clearly speaks in

10

terms of assignments being voidable as opposed to being void

11

and voidable by the parties to the agreement itself.

12

These issues raised by Mr. Johnson and all of the

13

issues raised by Mr. Johnson as they relate to the partnership

14

I'm finding to be immaterial to the actual renewal of the

15

judgement itself and while it's not my intention to make any

16

prejudgement whatsoever or to offer any invitation whatsoever,

17

I want to make it clear that I do see a distinction consistent

18

with Ms. Tomsic's argument about the general principle of

19

renewal verses enforcement and clearly what is sought in this

20

particular case is renewal.

21

As it relates to the motion to strike, I'm going to

22

deny the motion —

23

that any decision by Judge Hansen quite frankly I gave no

24

weight to in rendering this particular decision.

25

I just really —

I want to make it clear

The affidavit submitted and I can't recall the persons
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name right now but it's the investigator affidavit.

2

did review those documents in the analytical frame work for

3

whether or not this motion for summary judgement should be

4

granted or denied or not, because it really —

5

why it was submitted, number 1 and number 2 I surmised from the

6

position taken, I think in the memo, that it was submitted in

7

case this court had some concerns about equitable

8

considerations and this court has not factored in any equitable

9

considerations into this particular decision.

10

While I

I struggled with

Consequently, I really see no utility in granting a

11

motion to strike because the subject matter upon which —

12

an attempt to have stricken was not relied upon by the Court in

13

rendering this decision.

14

was

So for those reasons, I'm going to rule in that matter

15

and instruct Ms. Tomsic to draft an order consistent with the

16

ruling and I'll ask, if it's possible and it may not be

17

possible that that order come to me approved at least as to

18

form by Mr. Johnson. If it's not possible then submit it

19

consistent with rule 7 and I'll wait for the appropriate

20

passage of time and get an order signed and entered.

21

MS. TOMSIC: Thank you, your Honor.

22

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

24

(Hearing concluded.)
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OCT 2 6 2004

Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200

*KE COUNTY

Attorneys for Defendant,
Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

JAYSON ORVIS,

PROPOSED
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

)

CIVIL NO. 020904919

JAMIS M. JOHNSON,

)
}
)

Honorable Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

On October 15, 2004, this matter came before the Court on Plaintiff Jayson
Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike Orvis Reply
Memorandum and Affidavit of William Crawley. Mr. Orvis was represented by Peggy A.
Tomsic. Mr. Johnson appeared pro se.
Based on the memoranda and argument of the parties,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Mr. Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

The judgment of Pamela Belding of March 3, 1992 (Utah Fourth Judicial

Circuit Court, Case No. 920400153) was validly assigned from Ms. Belding to All Star
Financial, L.L.C. and validly assigned from All Star Financial, L.L.C. to Jayson Orvis.
3.

Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike Orvis Reply Memorandum and Affidavit of

William Crawley is denied.
DATED this f_^ day of October, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

<>rK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct coy of the within and foregoing
PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this £ * S day of
October, 2004 to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney Pro Se
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200

IMACi
2ED
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENT^
a

PATE,

l®S

Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES

vs.

Case No. 020904919

JAMIS JOHNSON,
Honorable Tyrone Medley
Defendant.

In accordance with the ruling made at the hearing held on October 6, 2004 and
the Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic Regarding Attorneys' Fees filed October 7, 2004,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendant Jamis Johnson shall pay to Plaintiff
Jayson Orvis within 30 days of entry of this Order attorneys' fees in the amount of $785.

r"s Fees (

020904919

J D16496886
JOHNSON.JAMIS

K

DATED:

October

., 2004.
•HE COURT:

5* I "7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ _ day
of October, 2004, to the following:

Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

O
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant, Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.*'

4QRVJS:S HROPOOCD]
^
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JAMIS JOHNSON,
Case No. 010907449
Defendant.
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE,
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15,
Third-Party Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action. Orvis

provides consulting to law firms or businesses providing credit repair services. These
services consist of assisting in removing false or erroneous entries from the clients'
credit reports. Additionally, Orvis owns and licenses software, trademarks and trade
names, and other intellectual property used in the credit repair business to these law
firms and businesses, through various entities which he has established. Plaintiff seeks,
in this action, a judgment declaring that the Defendant has no right, claim or interest
relative to any business or venture relating to the credit repair business in which Plaintiff
has any ownership.
2.

Defendant Johnson, the Defendant in this case, asserts that a partnership

exists between him and Orvis and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds
from intellectual property lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various
credit repair entities, including an entity called The Lexington Law Firm.
3.

In addition to claiming a partnership interest in Orvis's credit repair

businesses, Johnson filed a Third Party Complaint against three third-party defendants,
including Deon Steckling. In Johnson's Answer and Third Party Complaint, he alleged
that Steckling, as well as the other third-party defendants, conspired with Orvis to
exclude Johnson from the partnership interest he allegedly had in Orvis's credit repair
related businesses. Johnson charged that the third-party defendants had
2

interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But,
you know, they're operating now without me.
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999, Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 23:6-24:10].
6.

On August 8, 2001, the SBA assigned its judgment against Johnson in the

SBA case to an entity called All Star Financial, L.L.C.
7.

On August 11, 2001, All Star Financial, L.L.C. assigned the judgment

against Johnson in the SBA case to Orvis.
8.

On March 30, 2004, Plaintiff Jayson Orvis filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Johnson from
claiming a partnership interest in any credit repair business of Orvis because of
Johnson's testimony under oath before the SBA. Third-party defendant Steckling
joined in Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

On August 9, 2004, the Court held a hearing on Orvis's and Steckling's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following
conclusions of law.

4
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1.

The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a

different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in
the SB A case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to contradict his
testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here. See Salt Lake City v.
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995) (the purpose of judicial
estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the
judicial process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the
court.").
2.

Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present

litigation be the same. See International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 517, n.4
(Utah 1979) (noting "a concededly overbroad statement in [the Court's] case of Tracy
Loan and Trust Co. v. Ooenshaw Inv. Co.. et aL 102 Utah 509. 132 P.2d 388. to the
effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the parties and the issues are
the same in the instant and the prior suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected
and superseded by our decision in Richards v. Hodson. [485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)]").
3.

Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present

proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not
determinative in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned
the judgment owned by the SBA, is in privity with the SBA. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 663 (2004) ("a privy is one who, after the commencement of the action,
5
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misappropriated the funds of the alleged partnership and had been unjustly enriched
thereby.
4.

Prior to Orvis's filing of the Declaratory Judgment Action, Johnson was

sued by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and judgment was entered against
him in that case on September 29, 1997. United States of America v. Jamis Johnson,
2:95-CV-838J, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Utah.
5.

In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes in the

SBA case, Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In his deposition, Johnson, under oath,
disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business of Orvis.
There was no question of mistake. Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection
efforts by the SBA. Johnson testified, under oath:
Q:

Do you have any interest in any partnership?

A:

No.

Q:

Any interest in any limited liability companies?

A:

No.

[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson
Orvis, at 30:16-31:4].
A:

Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship....
Lexington Law FirmQ was in my name, but since that time and
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any
3

has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or
under one of the parties, as by . .. assignment."); Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d
689 (1978) (The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property.).
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismisses Johnson's counterclaim against Plaintiff with prejudice. The
Court will enter a Declaratory Judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in
any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any
ownership interest. The Court also grants Deon Steckling's Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismisses the Third Party Complaint against him with prejudice.
DATED this ^ ^ of November, 2004.
BY T?HE COURT:

h/As

,

Honorable Timoth
/Third Judicial Disti
Salt Lake County,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on October 29, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy
of [JAYSON ORVIS'S PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street
#304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Blake S. Atkin
Atkin & Hawkins
136 South Main Street, #610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party Defendants
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
Heather Keele (10347)
TOMSIC LAW FIRM
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1995

KE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

I
)
])

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

;)

Case No. 020904919

j)

Honorable Tyrone Medley

]

On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion
for Rule 11 Sanctions Against Plaintiff Orvis, Attorney Tomsic, and her law firm,
Berman, Tomsic & Savage. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A.
Tomsic and Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se.
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion;

\nz

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is
denied.
DATED:

March

, 2005.
BYTHE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC.

^egqv
>eggy A. Tomsic
Heather Keele
PROSE

Jamis Johnson

\V-T«,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS to be sent by facsimile and
mailed, postage prepaid, t h i s / ^ day of •March, 2005, to the following:

Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street, #304
Salt Lake City, UT84111
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY - 2 2005
J y ^ A L T LAKE COUNTY

yaf—

Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
Heather Keele (10347)
TOMSIC LAW FIRM
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1995

f

^

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAYSON ORVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

]i

ORDER

;)

Case No. 020904919

]I

Honorable Tyrone Medley

]

On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for
Contempt against Defendant. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A.
Tomsic and Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se.
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion, HEREBY ORDERS
1.

Defendant shall pay the attorneys' fees ordered by the Court on November

03, 2004 to Plaintiff within 90 days of the March 14, 2005 hearing.

\\A-\

2.

The Court shall hold Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt in abeyance, to be

renewed if Defendant fails to pay the attorneys' fees as ordered.
DATED:

M a r c h 2 ^ , 2005.
BVTHE COURT:

^M/of
^Honorable Tyrone Medley
Thira District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC.

Peggy A. Tomsic
Heather Keele

PROSE

Jamis Johnson

l\CL"7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
ORDER to be sent by mail, postage prepaid, this £f£ day of T&arett; 2005, to the
following:

Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street, #304
Salt Lake City, UT84111

wctTS

Tab 7

ADDENDUM 7

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY - 2J005

Deputy Clerk

Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
Heather Keele (10347)
TOMSIC LAW FIRM
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1995
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAYSON ORVIS,

\

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIS JOHNSON,
Defendant.

])
I
)
I
]
I
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 020904919
Honorable Tyrone Medley

On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Rule 11 Sanctions Against Plaintiff Orvis, Attorney Tomsic, and her law firm, Berman,
Tomsic & Savage. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A. Tomsic and
Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se.
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion, hereby makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

WV5

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the

narrow legal issue of whether a judgment owned by Plaintiff against Defendant should
be renewed.
2.

Defendant opposed Plaintiff's motion June 1, 2004. In Defendant's

opposition, he made numerous factual allegations that were equitable in nature, and
that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons why Defendant should not be
held to the judgment owed by him.
3.

In reply, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of William Crawley, an investigative

paralegal whom Ms. Tomsic had hired to look into the financial affairs of Defendant.
Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit to counter the equitable case Defendant had
attempted to make in his opposition.
4.

As Defendant later learned and informed Ms. Tomsic, Mr. Crawley did not

possess a private investigator's license when conducting his investigation of
Defendant's financial affairs.
5.

On November 24, 2004, Defendant filed the instant motion alleging a Rule

11 violation because Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's license when
investigating his financial affairs and because Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit,
which, according to Defendant, was irrelevant and scandalous.

2

5.

Ms. Tomsic had no knowledge that Mr. Crawley was required to and did

not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not intend in any way
to operate outside the law.
6.

Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. Crawley

7.

Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the information contained in

the affidavit of Mr. Crawley, except that he contests the number of times he has
appeared as a defendant in the State of Utah, but does not provide a counter-number
or any record support for his contestation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
8.

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not cover this situation

or the actions complained about by Defendant.
9.

As noted, Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr.

Crawley.
10.

Even, however, were the affidavit deemed irrelevant, Rule 11 does not

provide for sanctions for submitting irrelevant material.
11.

The fact that Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's license is

of no legal moment in this proceeding.
12.

Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is denied.
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DATED:

March

, 2005
BY TitfE COURT:

\\~I4D

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC.

Peggy A. Tomsic
Heather Keele
PROSE

Jamis Johnson

\\~tf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be sent by facsimile and mailed, postage
prepaid, this*$£_day of March, 2005, to the following:

Jamis M. Johnson
Johnson & Associates
352 South Denver Street, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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